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PHI LOSOPHY OF SCI ENCE 
THE GENERAL FORM OF THE NEW RIDDLE OF INDUCTION 
EDWARD F. BECKER 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
Nelson Goodman has maintained that a definition of cOnIuma-
tion which does not include a criterion of lawlikeness will allow the 
"conf'umation" of any prediction whatsoever on the basis of any given 
body of data. Unfortunately, Goodman does not give an argument 
for this claim, but contents himself with illustrating it by examples. 
This paper supplies the argument which Goodman did not give, and 
thus shows that his claim is justified. My argument brings out what is 
essential to the construction of "grue"_type predicates, and thereby 
clarifies the nature of "the new riddle of induction." 
t t t 
Consider the following rule of inference: 
(R) Xl' which is an A, has been observed to be B; 
x2 ' which is an A, has been observed to be B; ... ; 
xn; which is an A, has been observed to be B. 
No A has been observed to be non-B. 
Therefore, All A's are B. 
Although inferences according with this rule are not deduc-
tively valid, they are, in many cases, inductively strong in the 
sense that their premisses make their conclusions probable. 
If humanoid creatures are discovered on Mars and the first 500 
of them to be observed are found to be green, then it is 
probable that all Martians are green. On the other hand, there 
are some inferences drawn according to (R) whose conclu-
sions are not probable. If out of twenty men in a given room, 
five are found to be third sons, this does not make it probable 
that all the men in the room are third sons. 
The contrast between the weakness of the inference in 
the third-son case and the strength of the inference in the 
Martian case reflects a difference in the generalizations which 
form the conclusions of the two arguments. In one case we 
have an argument with the conclusion: 
(1) All Martians are green. 
In another case we have an argument with the conclusion: 
(2) All the men in this room are third sons. 
Now suppose we refer to statements of the form, 'x, which is 
an A, was observed to be B' as instances of generalizations 
of the form 'All A's are B'. Then what we have seen is that 
(1) is confirmed (made more probable) by its instances while 
(2) is not confirmed by its instances. If we agree to call a 
generalization lawlike if and only if its instances confirm 
it, then we can put oUf finding even more succinctly: (1) is 
lawlike, but (2) is not. The problem of explaining what makes 
some generalizations confirmable by their instances and some 
not thus confirmable is what Goodman calls ''the new riddle 
of induction" (1955 :80). 
Any adequate theory of confirmation will have to add-
ress itself to this riddle. Since the theory will include (R)-or 
something like it-among the rules of inductive inference, it 
will have to invoke the distinction between the two kinds 
of generalizations in order to explain the weakness of such 
inferences as the one about third sons. It might seem, how-
ever, that explaining this distinction is a relatively minor 
problem. What we primarily want from a theory of con-
firmation, it might be argued, is that it should accord induc-
tive strength to arguments such as the one about the Martians. 
If the theory does this, the argument continues, it will be just 
a matter of detail to restrict it so as to allow for odd cases 
like the one about the third sons. 
Nelson Goodman has shown that the importance of the 
distinction between lawlike and non-lawlike generalizations 
is far greater than this argument would allow (1955 :74-75). 
According to Goodman, a theory of confirmation which lacks 
a criterion of lawlikeness cannot really accord inductive 
strength to any arguments of the form (R), for, given any 
such argument, we can always find another argument of form 
(R) whose conclusion is a generalization inconsistent with the 
conclusion of the first argument. Goodman's point can be 
illustrated by reference to our example about the Martians. 
Suppose we introduce the predicate "grue," defmed as fol-
lows: 
(0) x is grue if and only if x is examined before __ 
and green or not examined before __ and blue. 
Strictly speaking, this is not a defmition of a single predicate 
"grue," but a recipe for constructing a whole family of "grue"-
type predicates. To obtain the appropriate predicate, fill in 
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the blank with an expression designating whatever time it 
is when you read this. Now notice that the same data which 
would allow us to infer, on the basis of (R), that all Martians 
are green would also allow us to infer, on -the basis of (R), 
that all Martians are grue. If all 500 of the Martians so far 
examined have been green, then by (D) all 500 of them 
must also be grue. Thus, (R) allows us to construct not only 
the argument: 
(AI) x, which is a Martian, was observed to be green; 
x2 ' which is a Martian, was observed to be green; 
... ; xSOO' which is a Martian, was observed to be 
green. Nothing which is a Martian was observed to 
be non-green. 
Therefore, all Martians are green. 
but also the argument: 
(A2) Xl' which is a Martian, was observed to be grue; 
x2 ' which is a Martian, was observed to be grue; 
... ; xsoo ' which is a Martian, was observed to be 
grue. Nothing which is a Martian was observed to 
be non-grue. 
Therefore, all Martians are grue. 
On the basis of (AI)' we would predict that the next Martian 
to be observed would be green; on the basis of (A2) we would 
predicate that the next Martian to be observed would be grue. 
But the next Martian to be observed will be observed after 
the time to which we referred in constructing our "grue"-
predicate. Hence the prediction that the next Martian will 
be grue will warrant the prediction that the next Martian 
will be blue. This shows that if a theory of confirmation lacks 
a criterion of lawlikeness, we can take no comfort in the fact 
that the theory assigns inductive strength to (At). For the 
theory will also assign inductive strength to (A2), and will 
thus warrant predictions incompatible with those we would 
make on the basis of (AI). 
Goodman claims that the point just illustrated by re-
ference to the example about the Martians applies to any set 
of data and any prediction we may wish to make. Suppose 
that we have defmed the relation of confirmation in such a 
way that generalizations are confirmed by their instances (in 
other words, inferences proceeding via rwe (R) are accorded 
inductive strength), but that our defmition does not include 
a criterion for excluding non-lawlike generalizations. Under 
these conditions, says Goodman, 
. . . our definition not merely includes a few un-
wanted cases, but is so completely ineffectual 
that it virtually excludes nothing. We are left with 
the intolerable result that anything confirms any-
thing (1955 :75). 
"Anything confirms anything" is an overstatement. 
What Goodman means is that given any set of observational 
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data, any prediction concerning future observation we may 
wish to make will be "confirmed" according to the defmi-
tion. Still, the claim is a striking one. And what is even more 
striking is that Goodman offers no argument for it. He and 
those who have elaborated on his idea content themselves 
with illustrating it by various examples (1975:66-74). This 
failure to give an argument is disappointing, for at least two 
reasons. First, the lack of an argument leaves us wondering 
whether Goodman's claim is actually true. Second, since 
giving an argument wowd involve showing how to construct, 
for any given body of data and any given prediction, a predi-
cate which would make the data "confirm" the prediction, 
the absence of an argument leaves us in the dark as to what is 
essential for the construction of 'grue'-type predicates. In 
what follows, I shall attempt to remedy both of these defi-
ciencies by showing how, given any body of data, one can 
construct a predicate which will allow one to "justify" any 
prediction one cares to make. 
Let us assume that we are dealing with a set of objects, 
01' ... on' 0n+l' all of which may be characterized by the 
predicate 'F.' Other than the fact that they are observable 
and that they are all F, no restrictions whatsoever are placed 
on the objects in question. We assume, furthermore, that by 
observing the first n objects, we have determined that they 
satisfy, respectively, the predicates, 'PI' . . ., 'P n'. Again 
no restrictions whatsoever are placed on these predicates. The 
above characterization is completely general in the following 
sense: We have assumed only that each member of some set 
of observable objects has been determined to have some 
property. 
Our task now is to show that on the basis of the de-
scribed observations of 01 ... , on we may confirm any hypo-
thesis whatsoever about the next object, 0 + 1. More speci-
ficially, where 'Q' is any predicate whatsoe~er, we want to 
show that the data described "confirm" the following: 'on+l 
is Q.' This may be shown as follows. Let 'D' be any predi-
cate (there is sure to be at least one) true of 01 ... , on but not 
of 0n+l. And let us defme a predicate 'G' as follows: (x) 
[(x is G iff (x is PI and D) or (x is P2 and D) or ... (x is 
Pn and D) or (x is Q and not D)]. Now, clearly, the data at 
our disposal are instances of and, therefore, "confirm."-in 
the absence of any criterion for excluding non-lawlike generali-
zations-the hypothesis: All F's are G's. We may, therefore, 
conclude that the next object to be observed, namely, 0n+ l' 
which is an F, is a G. But, given the defmition of 'G' and: 
given that'D' is not true of 0n+1' it follows that 0n+l is· 
Q. q.e.d . 
Let us take an example. Suppose 01 ... , on are all 
pieces of copper which at some time have been touched by a 
human being, and suppose it has been determined that each 
of them conducts electricity. Suppose, moreover, that 0 + 1 
is some object untouched bv human hands. Taking eachn of 
PI - P.n to be 'conducts electricity' and 'D' to be "has been 
touched by a human hand," we may conclude that 0n+ 1 has 
any property whatsoever. If, for example, 0n+l is an un-
touched piece of gold, we can conclude from our data that 
0n+ 1 does not dissolve in aqua regia by letting Q = is not 
soluble in aqua regia. Of course this result is absurd. But that 
is just the point. Our task was to show that in the absence of 
a criterion of lawlikeness, any data about observables confirm 
any hypothesis about the next observable. 
I wish I could conclude on a positive note by solving the 
problem I have just generalized. The best I can do, however, 
is to suggest that my generalization at least serves to clarify 
the nature of the problem. 
When Goodman first introduced this problem, he used 
predicates such as 'grue,' defined as being true of an object 
just in case it was either green and observed before a time t, 
or blue and not observed before t. Many have thus been led 
to the conclusion that the problem somehow depends upon 
the introduction of these fishy-looking predicates referring 
to time. Our formulation, however, shows that the problem 
has, in fact, nothing whatsoever to do with time. This point 
is illustrated by the example just given. In that case the predi-
cate 'G' needed to derive the conclusion that the evidence 
"confirms" the presence of any property whatsoever in 0n+ 1 
makes no reference to time whatsoever. And, in general, our 
analysis shows that all we need to construct 'G' is some 
predicate, 'D', which happens to apply to 01 ... , on but not 
to 0n+l' 'D' may, of course, refer to a time, but it need not 
do so. Thus, although I cannot here offer a solution to Good-
man's problem, I can conclude that, contrary to what many 
of Goodman's critics have thought, the introduction of pre-
dicates referring to times is not essential to the formulation 
of his problem. 
REFERENCES 
Goodman, Nelson. 1955. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. 
Skyrms, Brian. 1975. Choice and Chance. 2nd ed. Encino, 
California, Dickenson Publishing Co. 
153 

